

UNEQUAL WORLD



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How can some have so much and some so little? Inequality divides and rules the world

By Sharmila Joshi

The world is an extremely unequal place. One-quarter of the world's 6 billion people in the year 2000 lived below the lower poverty line of \$1 a day. About half were below the upper poverty line of \$2 a day. At the other end of the disparity spectrum, the world's richest 225 individuals have combined assets of anything from \$1 to 3 trillion (this figure varies because the rich are less vulnerable to being probed and counted; they have the means to protect their wealth from official quantification).

But world inequality, as Bob Sutcliffe writes in *100 Ways of Seeing an Unequal World*, is not a simple concept that can be assigned a single value. "Multitudinous inequalities exist in human society," the economist writes, "of income, welfare, rights, power and prestige, based on class, caste, gender, ethnicity, age, sexual preference and many more things."

How inequality may be quantified has in fact been a matter of vigorous global debate. A vast array of indicators periodically emerge from such official statisticians of the globe as the United Nations' multiple agencies and the World Bank. Year after year, they tell us, for example, that in Norway, amongst the UNDP's top rankers in its annual Human Development Report (which measures income, life expectancy and literacy), life expectancy at birth is 78.7 years, there is 100% literacy and annual income is just under \$30,000. In Sierra Leone, chances of survival beyond age 35 are speculative, two in three people have no education, and annual income is \$470 a year. The very fact that many of us may often have read such figures is cause for concern: what makes such an unequal world possible? What will it take to make it more equal? What is more alarming is the fact that inequality — as is evident from

these agencies' multiple indicators — is actually growing across the globe.

In the 1960s, per capita GDP in the richest 20 countries was 18 times that in the poorest 20 countries. By 1995, this gap had widened to 37 times. More than 50 countries suffered falling living standards during the 1990s. Life expectancy and illiteracy fell in 21 countries during this decade. According to the UN Habitat Report, by 2030, one in three human beings on this planet will be living in a slum. All this at a time when, by 1999, the top 20% of the globe's population was consuming 86% of all goods and services.

Inequality is growing sharply between countries and also within countries. On the UN's HDR, the US is close to the top rankers. But the number of Americans living in poverty rose to 12.4% during the 1990s. Among minority Blacks and Hispanics, the percentage is almost double. The wealthiest 5% of Americans, on the other hand, cornered close to 60% of the nation's wealth.

In Sierra Leone (which ranks low on the HDR), the richest tenth receive over 80 times the income of the poorest tenth. In a number of Latin American and African countries, the ratio exceeds 40. At a time when India was supposed to be 'shining', when malls were mushrooming alongside upscale restaurants and consumption of cars, the country slipped three places in the HDR. It is now ranked at 127.

Although the data quoted above comes from agencies hardly known for their radical agendas, a contentious debate rages about whether global inequality is indeed growing. On one side are the globalists — mainstream economists, finance ministers, the IMF, the transnational corporations — who see the last 15-20 years of rising market-driven integration of the global economy as the cause of declining global inequalities and improving levels of human welfare. On the other side are the anti-globalists who see the expansion of

Fundamental inequalities between North and South



Each bar shows the distribution in about 1998 of a demographic or economic indicator between the countries of the North on the one hand (in white) and those of the South on the other (black). The binary division of the world into North and South is very common. While too simplified for most purposes it nonetheless yields some important pointers to the nature of world inequalities. Start with the fifth bar, showing the division of the population between North and South. This is a simple yardstick for a 'fair share'. Equality between North and South would mean that the other bars were divided in the same proportions as population. But they are not. From the first four bars we see that the South has more than its fair share of children's deaths, rural dwellers, total births and the overall burden of disease. But it has less than its fair share of total deaths, cultivated land, urban dwellers, income, CO₂ emissions, health spending, exports and military spending. So we see here a world in which four-fifths of the economic resources devoted to health are spent in countries which have only 8% of the burden of disease, in which the countries inhabited by only 20% of the population receive 60% of the world's income and are responsible for 80% of world trade and an even higher proportion of military spending.

Source: World Bank 1999a; WHO 1999; SIPRI 2000, UNCTAD 1999a. Reprinted from 100 Ways of Seeing an Unequal World by Bob Sutcliffe

the integrated international market and of corporate and financial interests as one of the main causes of the growing inequality.

New economic policies — introduced in country after country from the 1980s believe there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency: to have an efficiently functioning market, economy, and consistent growth, we must give up the idea of equity or more equality or more equal distribution. The opposite view says that it is the inequality of the slices that the cake is cut into that determines or impedes its size. The more equal the slices, the more the cake — or the economy and society, or equality and prosperity for all — can grow. In other words, inequality — and not equality — impedes growth.

Numerous mainstream publications dismiss UN and World Bank data on inequality. A Brookings Institution paper of May 2002 calls the debate on increasing trends in inequality “silly”. A March 2004 issue of the Economist says such figures are “always larger than the likely reality”. The magazine mocks the growing concern over inequality amongst those who see a connection between the rich enjoying their privileges at the expense of the poor as a “debilitating preoccupation with 'global inequality'.”

A formidable array of economists associated with global think-tanks and privately-funded policy institutes, who the Economist quotes, show through their work “rapid — indeed historically unprecedented — falls in poverty during the 1980s and 1990s, the new golden age of capitalism.” According to these thinkers, the proportion of the world's people living on less than \$1 a day has fallen so greatly that “the decline has been enough to offset rising population in developing countries”. India is cited as an example of how great the benefits of global economic integration can be.

A lot of these squabbles relate, along with ideological beliefs about the benefits of a free


market, to the murky world of statistics. Some of the debate centres on how precisely inequality may be measured. And some of it centres on how it might be addressed: through a more or less globally integrated market.

Sidestepping the quarrel, in a 2002 article titled 'How to Judge Globalism', economist Amartya Sen writes, "Even if the poor were to get just a little richer, this would not necessarily imply the poor were getting a fair share of the potentially vast benefits of global economic integration. It is not adequate to ask whether international inequality is getting marginally larger or smaller. In order to rebel against the appalling poverty and the staggering inequalities that characterise the contemporary world...it is not necessary to show that the massive inequality or distributional unfairness is also getting marginally larger. That is a separate issue altogether."

Beyond the numbers, lie people's real lives, struggles and deaths. Whether inequality is growing may remain contested. But, on an additional \$28 billion a year, basic education, clean water, basic healthcare and basic nutrition could be made available to all the poor people in the world. When Western Europe and America spend \$35 billion a year on cosmetics, ice cream and pet food, something is not right in this grossly unequal equation. As Arturo Escobar, critical anthropologist, writes, "Genuine world prosperity is indivisible. It cannot last in one part of the world if other parts live under conditions of poverty and ill-health."

(Sharmila Joshi works in the academic field of historical sociology, with an interest in issues related to development, gender, labour and social movements. She has been a journalist writing for several years on social issues. She is currently Senior Assistant Editor of The Hindustan Times, Mumbai)

Who is hyper-rich?



Source: H Merrill Lynch and Gemini Consulting 2000. Reprinted from 100 Ways of Seeing an Unequal World by Bob Sutcliffe

Inequality in India

The consumption of the top 20% of the urban population has shot up since 1989. That of 600 million Indians has actually declined

By Richa Nigam







Income and health

Jayati Ghosh, economist and chairperson of the State Commission on Welfare of Farmers writes (People's Democracy, February 2004), "The period since the neo-liberal economic reforms were introduced in India has been one of dramatically increased income inequality. The most dramatic and remarkable improvement in consumption has been of those who were already the richest people in India that is, the top 20% of the urban population."

The per capita consumption of this segment has increased by about 40% since 1989-90. The real figures may be higher since the National Sample Surveys (the NSS is a nationwide, continuous operation in the form of successive rounds) underestimates the consumption of the rich, according to Ghosh. "This is the highest and most rapid increase in the consumption of the rich that has ever been recorded in India," she writes. On the other side of the scale, for 600 million people who constitute the bottom 80% of India's rural population, per capita consumption has actually declined since 1989-90.

"Inequality in India has grown faster in the last 10-12 years than any other time in our history since the colonial raj," P Sainath, senior journalist and Rural Affairs Editor at The Hindu, says. The evidence is especially stark in such areas as health. In 2003, a national newspaper reported the deaths due to malnutrition-related causes of over 9,000 children

Measuring inequality



Source: Human Development Report, UNDP, 2003

below the age of 6. This was in 15 largely adivasi-populated districts of Maharashtra, just a few kilometres from super-specialty private hospitals in Mumbai.

All over the country people are dying of diseases that should not kill them. For instance, 199 per 100,000 people in India still die of tuberculosis every year (UNDP). And it is not specialised care they need, but basic preventive care, especially in childhood. Instead, the Government of India reduced its expenditure on the children's nutrition programme from Rs 79.2 million to Rs 77.7 million in the 2003 budget. Government expenditure on health as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined from 1.3 in 1990, to 0.6% in 2002. This is well below the 5% of GDP recommended by the World Health Organisation.

The Human Development Report 2002 (UNDP), drawing on data collected from 1995-2000, states that in India less than 50% of the population have access to essential drugs, only 31% have adequate sanitation facilities, 47% of children below the age of 5 are underweight, and only 42% of births are attended to by skilled health staff. In short, public healthcare expenditure does not match peoples' health needs.

Despite this dismal picture, today, in the name of sectoral reforms, many public health services are no longer provided free of cost. The Citizens Report on Governance and Development 2003, Social Watch India, says: "The level of public expenditure in the health sector is the lowest in the world...[less than in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka]... Privatisation and deregulation of the health system have resulted in rising drug prices. [The] new National Health Policy 2002 legitimises the ongoing privatisation of health."

The push for increased participation of private sector entities in healthcare services is evident, for example, in Andhra Pradesh. The state government in recent years has boosted the private sector in health, promoted corporate hospitals and pioneered the 'user-fee'

system in government hospitals. This systematic dismantling of the public health system has driven poor people to private hospitals.

The result has been increasing health expenses, leading to indebtedness and impoverishment, especially in rural areas. Most people run out of money halfway through treatment. As P Sainath says, “Those who fall ill are selling land, gold, cattle and other assets to pay off medical bills. They also take loans that they can never repay. Health spending is amongst the fastest-growing components of rural family debt.”

Education

Although India ranks a low fourth in South Asia in terms of both adult literacy rate and youth/child literacy, several achievements have been recorded in the field of education since Independence, according to government data. The average literacy rate was 65% in 2001 (up from 18% in 1951). The number of uneducated persons declined for the first time since Census 1951 by almost 32 million in absolute terms between 1991 and 2001.

But the improvements pale when you consider that every third illiterate person in the world is an Indian. Of approximately 200 million children in the 6-14 age-group, only 120 million are enrolled in school. “Inadequate budget allocation, dismal school infrastructure in rural areas, high dropout rates, caste-bias, gender-bias, etc, are the hallmarks of our education system,” a report states.

There have been consistently regressive budgetary allocations for education. Important educational schemes like the National Programme for Women's Education have been scrapped. While successive governments have been promising to increase education expenditure to 6% of GDP, central and state government spending on education has gone

down from 4% in 1991-92 to 3.2% in 1996-97. Less than half of the total amount is spent on primary education.

Dropout rates are high in India — over 50% from Class I to VIII (CMIE, February 1995). The high rates are not due to lack of demand for schooling from the relatively poorer households, as is sometimes assumed. The problems are mainly on the supply side. Even the minimal infrastructure is missing in a large number of schools.

According to the fifth all-India education survey (NCERT, 1990): (i) Barely half of the primary schools have a stone building; (ii) 42% have a single classroom (if any); (iii) Just over half have a usable blackboard; (iv) Less than half have drinking water facilities; (v) More than 60% have only one or two teachers (if any) for classes I to V. This is the average all-India figure; the corresponding figures for rural areas are worse.

A Public Report on Basic Education (PROBE) team of researchers conducted a detailed survey of the school system in North India in 1996. In 188 randomly selected villages of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, the report surveyed the school facilities and interviewed 1,221 households. It found that parents spend about Rs 366 per year to send a child to a government school. For an average agricultural labourer, sending two children to primary school would mean 30 days' wages.

On November 28, 2001, Parliament passed the 93rd amendment making education for the 6-14 age-group compulsory but, significantly, not free of cost. It therefore imposes on parents the duty of sending their children to school while not requiring states to invest in making education accessible to all.

In such a scenario, there is an increasing dependence on market forces to fill the educational deficit. "Now your educational attainment has very little to do with your quality

as a student and everything to do with your ability to pay,” P Sainath says. The education system in India has become a new source of inequality. Education is a right guaranteed by the Constitution but the monopoly of knowledge enjoyed by the upper castes in the past is being reproduced today in a different form.

(Richa Nigam is a freelance writer based in Mumbai)

Some indicators from the Human Development Report, 2003


No	Indicator	Value
1	HDI Rank	127
2	Human Poverty Index (Rank)	53
3	Human Poverty Index (Value)	33.1
4	Population living below \$1 a day (%), 1990-2001	34.7
5	Population living below \$2 a day (%), 1990-2001	79.9
6	Population living below the national poverty line (%), 1987-2000	28.6
7	Human Poverty Indicators: Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort), 2000-05	15.3
	Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and above) 2001	42.0
	Population without sustainable access to an improved water source (%), 2000	16.0
	Children under-weight for age (% below age 5), 1995-2001	47.0
8	Inequality in income or consumption (1997)	
	Share of income or consumption (%) - Poorest 10%	3.5
	Share of income or consumption (%) - Poorest 20%	8.1
	Share of income or consumption (%) - Richest 10%	33.5
	Share of income or consumption (%) - Richest 20%	46.1
9	Inequality Measures - Ratio of richest 10% to poorest 10%	9.5
	Inequality Measures - Ratio of richest 20% to poorest 20%	5.7
	Inequality Measures - Gini Index	37.8

Source: Human Development Indicators, 2003, UNDP

Who is poor?

These graphs are based on the World Bank's concept of income poverty, which estimates the numbers of people in the world living below a given level of income. The two charts on the left show the percentage of the population and the absolute numbers of people who are estimated to have incomes below \$1 a day and how this has evolved between 1987 and 1998. The right-hand chart shows the absolute numbers of people living on less than \$2 a day.

These figures, rapidly becoming the most-quoted economic figures in the world, show that about one-quarter of the world's population is below the lower poverty line (\$1 a day) and about half below the upper poverty line (\$2). The percentages have declined very slowly in the two poorest regions, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, and quite sharply in China and other parts of East Asia; but they have risen sharply in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Over the ten years covered by these estimates the total number of poor people in the world, according to this absolute definition, has either stayed about the same or risen.



Source: World Bank 2000. Reprinted from 100 Ways of Seeing an Unequal World by Bob Sutcliffe

Who wrote the dictionary of development?

Definitions and parameters are questionable

By Sharmila Joshi

How did some parts of the world get categorised as ‘developed’, and others as ‘developing’ or ‘underdeveloped’? Such terminology did not exist in frequent global currency until about 50 years ago. High levels of global inequality — long set in motion by imperialism and colonialism — became a matter of global debate after World War II, decolonisation, emerging American hegemony and the setting up of the Bretton Woods institutions.

The day US President Truman took office, January 29, 1949, metaphorically opened the ‘era of development’. He talked of promoting the “growth of underdeveloped areas” of the world. “Never before had a word been universally accepted on the very day of its political coinage...” Gustavo Esteva, economist and political activist, writes. “Underdevelopment... began on January 29, 1949. On that day, two billion people became underdeveloped.”

The word had been used earlier in global meetings. A member of the International Labour Organisation had referred to “underdeveloped areas” in 1942. Others in the emerging post-war global order had talked of “economically backward areas” and the gap between rich and poor nations. But Truman’s pronouncement made ‘developmentalism’, to use a term from Richard Peet, political geographer, the dominant ‘ism’ for decades.

Many post-developmentalists such as Esteva question the terms of the development discourse. The claim is not that gross global inequalities do not exist — indeed it is argued

that inequality is growing and that in part this process is a result of centuries of colonialism. Instead, the argument stresses that American imperialism was itself manifest in the terminology the US deployed after the war, which thenceforth became the basis for categorising the world according to its ranking on the development ladder. The very notion of 'development' was derived from the West and mainly referred to economic growth.

The institutional pillars of the post-war world — the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (now the WTO) and the United Nations — with charters closely replicating American geopolitical and economic interests in the Cold War years — soon set forth a torrent of quantification. Countries began to get classified as high-income economies (developed), middle-income economies (developing) and low-income economies (underdeveloped). Simultaneously, terms such as First, Second and Third Worlds began to be used. Originally, these were political categories: the First World was the Western capitalist nations, the Second World was the socialist states under the umbrella of the USSR and the Third World implied 'positive neutralism' in the context of the Cold War.

"However," Alan Thomas, development theorist, writes, "well before the collapse of...the Soviet Union, the main connotation of the term Third World had become 'underdeveloped' or simply 'poor'." The Third World became a geographically discontinuous region of a disparate group of countries. Similarly, terms such as 'North' and 'South', originally hemispheric, became synonymous with the 'developed' and the 'developing/underdeveloped' world or with the First and Third Worlds.

How was this world to be defined? By what measures would a country fall in the dreaded underdeveloped category? Defining 'development' has never been easy, even when development is viewed in purely economic terms. Esteva says it is like an amoeba,

constantly changing shape. The post-war Bretton Woods institutions themselves were never sure on what basis they could classify the world. Thomas narrows down these multiple measures to five aspects of development, which he uses separately or in combination to attempt to define the 'Third World':

(i) Independence from colonial rule and recognition as an independent state by other countries and the UN. (ii) GNP is a common method of ranking countries according to economic well-being. However GNP is an average and does not indicate inequalities within a country. The World Bank has also used exports and external debt as indicators of development. (iii) Industrialisation, which implies an increase in GDP and a transformation in production methods (such as even industrialised agriculture). This also implies related social and cultural changes. (iv) National and global integration, or how countries are linked to the global economy and how they are internally economically structured. Countries of North America and Western Europe supposedly have more modern, integrated economies; the others less so. (v) Social indicators of development such as health, literacy, status of women, access to clean water. Included here is the PQLI (Physical Quality of Life Index), which measures life expectancy, infant mortality and adult literacy. The UNDP's Human Development Index is a composite indicator combining economic and social welfare. HDI gives equal weight to longevity, education, and utility derived from income. Yet another index of development is rights and freedoms — right to life, to security, freedom of expression, of religion. According to this index, countries can be classified as most free or least free.

These measures, as well as the very idea of 'development', have been frequently challenged throughout the 'era of development'. As Peet writes, "Developmentalism is a battleground." Environmentalists, feminists, Marxists and others have questioned what such quantification — and the proliferating attendant 'development' policies and budgetary

allocation, which severely alter millions of lives — have achieved. Why has the world become more unequal half a century of 'development' later?

A brief history of development

1950s: Initially, development, viewed as only economic growth, was a goal implied in the United Nations Charter of 1947. The 1952 UN Report on the World Social Situation concentrated on “existing social conditions”, not on programmes to deal with them. The overriding concern was with economic quantifiers: industrialisation and GNP dominated.

1960s: The expression ‘social development’ was introduced in UN reports. The social and the economic were seen as distinct categories, not as interrelated. In 1962, the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) recommended an integration of both aspects of development. That same year, the Proposals for Action of the First UN Development Decade (1960-70) emphasised that “development is growth plus (social, cultural and economic) change”. In 1963, the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) was formed, recognising the need for harmonising economic and social planning. In spite of this change in orientation, throughout the first UN Development Decade, development continued to be thought of as economic growth. By the end of the 1960s, with persistent inequalities, the ‘experts’ acknowledged that changes were necessary in their thinking about ‘development’.

1970s: A generalised revolt against the straitjacket of economic definitions of development. The World Bank (and its then president Robert McNamara) asserted that a high rate of growth did not mean satisfactory progress in development in the First Decade (1960-70) and the 1970s should move beyond economic indicators: this was the “dethronement of GNP”.

The International Development Strategy of October 1970 called for a global strategy; another UN resolution called for a unified approach to development and planning to fully integrate social and economic aspects. ‘Social equity’, ‘human potential’, ‘all sections of the population’, ‘structural change’ were keywords. It called for cross-sectoral integration and ‘participatory development’. These ideas animated debate in the following decades. Further declarations followed: the 1974 declaration of Cocoyoc, which emphasised diversity and different roads to development. The 1975 call (by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation), which called for “another development”.

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'Modernisation' or 'Dependency'?

It isn't all about catching up with the West

By Sharmila Joshi

About 50 years ago, many countries around the world — freshly decolonised and newly named 'underdeveloped' or developing, embarked on varying projects of national development. Some began to develop indigenous industries for export, others stepped up industrial production to substitute for imports. Across the Cold War swathe — communist as well as capitalist — industrialisation was thought of, by the political and economic elite, as the key to development.

In this singular conception of 'development' as economic growth, industrialisation became a race of catching up with the West or with standards almost entirely set by West-centric institutions for a country to be deemed developed. Accompanying this frenetic activity was the project of modernisation.

This was seen by the presiding figures of many countries as, amongst others: infrastructural changes such as dams and highways; social changes such as getting rid of the perceived ills of traditional beliefs and practices and revamping educational systems with an emphasis on modern science and rationality; and political changes such as creating an efficient bureaucracy and State apparatus to preside over the decolonised domain.

This three-pronged strategy was underpinned by what came to be known as modernisation theory. The ideas of the modernisation school of economists indirectly informed the choices of 'development' made by the leaders of many countries.

Modernisation has been a dominant theory in the social sciences in the West since the

1950s. It draws on the biological sciences, which, since the last quarter of the 18th century in Western Europe, studied the growth and development of different species. The biological metaphor was transferred to the social sciences: societies, political institutions, economies were deemed to be growing organisms progressing according to an order natural to them. That is, the development of elements of social life was naturalised: made to appear as if development (as opposed to constant change) is directional, following a path of ever-near perfection. In reality, this 'naturalisation' was Westernisation in disguise. The so-called natural progress closely followed the trajectory of Western Europe and North America: how they had 'developed' became the blueprint for the rest of the world.

Modernisation theory became the foundation stone of this evolutionary prescription for development. The theory is not homogeneous — numerous proponents disagreed on several key features. But in broad outline, the theory focused on deficiencies in the poorer countries and speculated about ways to overcome these deficiencies. It viewed traditional society as a series of negatives: stagnant and unchanging, not innovative, not profit-making, not progressing, not growing.

It argued that about 500 years ago, most people in the world were poor or living in traditional (often subsistence) social arrangements. Scientific innovation existed in many parts of the world (China, India, the Middle East) but for a variety of reasons (not least of them the conquest of the New World and slavery, which modernisation theory bypasses), science and entrepreneurship grew in Western Europe. The engine of this economic growth was capitalism. Innovation and technological growth became self-sustaining in Western Europe because they were embedded in the capitalist system. Entrepreneurs were in competition: profits were pursued by lowering costs and increasing revenues and re-investing in order to make more profits. This ceaseless

accumulation and expansion spurred growth.

Some modernisation theorists emphasised the political modernisation that accompanied this economic advance: over a long period of time, feudal lords and autocratic monarchies were challenged and representative forms of government were established. This meant individual freedoms, political parties, elections, rule of law: in short, Western-style liberal democracy.

The Third World did not undergo these economic or political transformations: it was 'left behind'. So the task of the Third World is to transform itself from tradition to modernity. That is, to follow in the footsteps of the West. In fact, because the path is now charted, these countries can avoid the mistakes made by the West.

One of the most influential modernisation theorists was W W Rostow of the US. His 1960 book (*The Stages of Economic Growth*) outlined five stages — much quoted in critical development literature — using the metaphor of airplanes and take-off: from the traditional society to the take-off (old resistances fall, political power accrues to a group interested in promoting economic growth, the country's savings rate grows, modern technology is applied) to the drive to maturity (economic growth spreads, integration into international markets) and the age of high mass consumption (fruits of growth finally transferred to the bulk of the people): airplanes flying smoothly in the sky.

As countries prepare to launch their airplanes or struggle to keep them flying, they need assistance: funds, technology, new markets. Many modernisation theorists stress correct policies. So the need for all the consultants and experts in the World Bank, the UN, all constantly advising different governments. All operating according to formula.

The flaws in this theory are numerous. It does not consider what will happen if the 'aeroplanes' fail to 'take-off' or if the ones already flying start to slow down. This means developed countries must continue to grow if they are to keep afloat and if they are to 'assist' the developing countries. The theory also does not consider such factors as the instability that existing inequalities may create. It sees no conflict between the interests of the rich and of the poor; it ignores the fact that the world's resources and benefits may be limited, that the accumulation of wealth in some hands might actually diminish the chances of others. Critiques such as dependency theory refer to its a-historicity and its Eurocentricism.

Dependency theory

Dependency theorists sharply critique the modernisation school. The earliest formulation of dependency theory came up alongside modernisation theory. The theory emerged first in Latin America, amongst social scientists such as Raul Prebisch, an Argentinian economist, who was Secretary to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America in the 1950s. The ideas of dependency were also developed, amongst others, by other Latin American social scientists such as Celso Furtado, Theotonio Dos Santos and FH Cardoso; by Samir Amin of Tanzania, by Andre Gunder Frank of Germany and by Paul Baran and Immanuel Wallerstein (who later formulated another, related version called world-systems theory) of the US.

Dependency is also not a homogeneous, unified theory — serious analytical differences persist within the school. But in essence it argues that the origins of persistent global poverty cannot be understood without reference to the entire international economic system. Underdevelopment is not a condition: it is an active process of impoverishment linked to development. That is, some parts of the world are underdeveloped because others are developed. They are not separate processes but two aspects of the same process.

In other words, economic growth in advanced countries created Third World poverty in its wake: not simply that the Third World is poor in comparison with the industrialised world; rather that it is poor because development of the industrial system in Western Europe and North America changed and impoverished many societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America, through colonialism, imperialism and extractive terms of trade.

Dependency argues that before the era of modern economic growth (until about 500 years ago), the world's major regions were not densely connected to each other (though extensive trade networks existed). When capitalism began to spread, the ceaseless search for profit began: through the production of agricultural goods in colonies or other lands, and Western Europe's ability to drive unequal bargains. This fundamentally changed the social structures of the Third World. The term "dependency" comes from this link: some say the exploitation of various regions for their raw materials and labour impoverished them and made them depend on the West. Others point out that in fact it is the other way around: that the West has been dependent on the Third World through history in order to be able to grow and prosper.

So, poverty in the Third World is not 'traditional' or accidental. It is a necessary companion to the wealth of the developed world. Historian Eric Williams, for example, argues that the slave trade was responsible for the emergence of a commercial middle class in Britain and eventually for Britain's industrial revolution. Slaves were taken from Africa to the Caribbean; their unpaid and coerced labour produced such profitable commodities as sugar or cotton, which were taken to Europe for huge profits. This provided the conditions for 'take-off' for Britain's industrial revolution.

Similarly, in the late-18th century, Haiti, now the poorest country in the northern

hemisphere, produced one-half of all the sugar and coffee consumed in Europe and the Americas, as well as substantial amounts of indigo and cotton. The approximately 500,000 slaves working on the colony's 8,000-odd plantations generated two-fifths of France's overseas trade

These examples indicate the dependency approach: the creation of underdevelopment at the cost of development. West African societies were uprooted by centuries of the slave trade; in the Caribbean the plantation system (set up to meet the needs of the colonists) met no local needs and impoverished workers. Mines in the Third World produced bauxite, tin, iron and other metals and minerals for the industries of the West. All of this depended on cheap indentured or slave labour. Many of the regions of the world were left with skewed, impoverished economies and devastated populations while the now-developed countries gained prosperity.

This was a grossly unequal exchange: the Third World gave much more than it got. The exchange may have created some new wealth in the Third World, some infrastructure, but it also created an international system of inequality. Members of dependency see this process as continuing. For example, transnational corporations bargain from a position of strength, distort the local economy, create vast income gaps, impose their own priorities, and damage the environment. Or the World Bank and IMF pursue policies that indirectly favour rich countries.

Modernisation theory sees capitalism as a creative force for growth and progress. Dependency sees international capitalism as the ruin of the Third World. Modernisation sees rich countries as helpers of poor countries; dependency sees them as the main obstacle to the well-being of the poorer countries. Not all of dependency theorists' prescriptions are anti-capitalism however: some advocate using capitalism and protectionism to enhance

national economies.

All such approaches are partial. Each looks at different patterns and comes up with different explanations. The world is like a ball of tangled string: one theory figuratively cuts it across with a knife and sees one intricate pattern; another cuts across another side to see another pattern. This often results in 'this' or 'that' arguments when reality is much more complex.

Whose idea of development?

The First-Third divide remains intact


By Sharmila Joshi

The 'development project', to use a term from sociologist Philip McMichael, dominated the globe — including post-independence India — for decades after World War II. In the pre-war world 'development' was not a globally touted concept. Much of the pre-war world was colonised. For example, one-fifth of the world's area and 25% of its population were under British rule. At the beginning of the 20th century, almost 90% of Africa was under direct European domination.

Colonies existed for the purposes of cheap labour, extraction, exploitation and unfair trade. Under such circumstances, any notion about 'developing' them — even in purely economic terms — would have been absurdly contradictory. Of course the colonisers periodically saw themselves as being responsible for civilising and improving the lives of the poor backward natives. The British government in 1939, for example, passed a Law of Development and Welfare of the Colonies. But the formerly colonised world largely corresponds to the Third World today in some measure due to this world's colonial history. Other factors stepped in post-Independence: rigid perceptions of 'development', corrupt states, dictatorships. But that is matter for separate analysis.

For large portions of the globe, to participate in any kind of economic development required decolonisation and independence. By the end of the world war, many colonising countries had suffered huge losses and faced economic collapse. Many became economically and militarily incapable of overseeing big empires. Growing independence movements across the globe soon forced a wave of

GDP per capita by region in 1820 and 1998



Source: Data from Maddison (2001): average annual growth rate in parentheses

decolonisation in the late-1940s, '50s and '60s.

The US, the emerging hegemonic power, argued that colonial monetary policies and policies of exclusionary trade (of both the European and Asian empires) had contributed to a global economic crisis. This in turn had led to conflict and large-scale war. Colonialism, the US argued, involved unsustainable trade barriers and unfair economic competition.

US policymakers wanted to eliminate the political and economic causes of conflict by fundamentally re-shaping relations among the states of the world. Critics have argued that the overriding concern was to expand markets for the US and ensure a supply of raw materials. US policymakers argued that independent states should join together to form a collective structure. This would ensure mutual protection against predatory states and sound political and trade policies to promote global growth. The UN was organised as a global political institution. It held its first general meeting in San Francisco in June 1945.

Alongside, the Bretton Woods institutions — the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT, later the WTO) — were formed at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire in 1944. Delegates from 45 countries participated. These institutions aimed to address economic problems and ensure global economic and financial stability. Together, they became the global institutional pillars of the new interstate system.

Through such measures as controls on exchange rates or on import and export quotas, the idea was to make the world stable for business to invest and profit, for trade to grow and for 'development' to occur.

The IMF would use the contribution of wealthy subscribers to provide emergency funds

to pay debts and avoid currency depreciation. This would stabilise global financial markets.

The World Bank would provide loans to ease cash shortages. Trade was to be restored by advancing credit to revitalise regions devastated by colonialism: the global banking operation would re-distribute funds to stimulate new production. The Bank was headquartered in Washington, DC. Its five biggest shareholders, beginning with the US, dominated the Bank. Until the 1990s the 10 richest industrial states controlled 53% of the Bank's votes; 45 African countries controlled just 4%.

The third tier of Bretton Woods, the GATT, was proposed to renegotiate terms of trade, reduce trade barriers, and settle disputes between trading partners. It started out as the International Trade Organisation and, in 1947, became the GATT.

Put together, the mandate of Bretton Woods was 'multilateral developmentalism': to create conditions for expanded trade, investment and economic growth. This set in motion an elaborate post-war system of influences and pressures whereby, some argue, the First World attempted to retain its control of the Third World under the guise of the 'development project'. The project promoted 'development' according to Western methods and primarily economic conceptions. This was the 1950s, the time of modernisation theory's ascendancy. The UN declared the 1960s and '70s as 'development decades'.

Over the years, the Bank promoted heavy technology transfer, established an institutional presence in Third World countries, promoted intensive agriculture, supported mega-projects: in short, pushed its 'development' model across the globe, including in India. There are several examples of the disasters unleashed by this model in the early decades. For example, since the mid-1970s, the World Bank, USAID, the governments of the Netherlands, France, Germany, the UNDP, and several others, began to give aid to a

project to resettle (poor) people away from the densely-populated Indonesian mainland to the Irian Jaya rainforest areas of eastern Indonesia.

Not surprisingly, people were not willing to be moved in this manner, and the inhabitants of the rainforests were not willing to have such invasive changes introduced in their lives. The Irian Jaya project was disastrous: the Indonesian army was brutally violent in the eviction and resettlement processes, homes and fields were burnt, social unrest exploded. At least 300,000 people were thus moved to transmigration sites (of an original target of 20 million). Many returned to the cities from where they had been forcibly moved.

At times, such projects took the form of big dams. The Aswan Dam on the Nile in Egypt, completed in 1966, is another example. Millennia-old agricultural rhythms around the Nile changed as a result of the dam. Work that used to be seasonal, depending upon when the plains flooded, became work round the year. New agricultural technology (chemical fertilisers, high-yielding grain, electricity-driven pumps) was introduced; the government started regulating what could be planted; railway networks were built to transport the produce. All this meant ‘progress’. It led to increased crop yields, and more income for some. But salinity levels also eventually rose, and fertility fell. In the old days, the farmers were dependent on the weather; now they were dependent on technology, railways, the government, chemical processes, and international markets.

Development agencies, anthropologist James Fergusson argues, had to “move the money”—to spend development money in order to get more and justify their existence. It was quickest and easiest to spend this on standardised projects and therefore to project countries in a way that made them seem like ideal ‘targets’. Country profiles on which projects were based had little resemblance to their reality. Fergusson calls this kind of

development literature (which determined distribution of billions of dollars and affected millions of lives) as “myth-making” or “re-arranging reality”.

Within each country in the post-war interstate system, ‘development’ models varied. But development projects imposed an essentially economic understanding of social life. Both the communist and capitalist variants shared a modernist paradigm: national industrialisation and modernisation was the vehicle of development. In many of the non-aligned parts of the world too, industrialisation became the catchphrase. Development states emerged in the Third World, characterised by state-dominated planning, public investment, and centralised administration, in order to ‘catch up’. ‘Development’ became the formula which dominated the post-war world and which changed — but not necessarily always improved — the lives of millions of its citizens.

Against this global background, India, newly-independent in 1947, and under the modernising influence of Nehru, set out to ‘develop’. In the tussle between the Gandhian vision — a less intensively industry-focused and more village-centric notion of development, opposed to the Nehruvian vision of heavy industrialisation and mega-projects, — the fast-track plans of the first prime minister of free India won.

The country embarked upon a top-down, investment-heavy, environmentally-questionable project of ‘development’, often with devastating results. After 50-plus years of this model the country has slipped to 127 on the UN’s Human Development Index of life expectancy, literacy and income.

Simultaneous to the development project, emerged numerous critiques. Fergusson argues how the project (as pursued by the global agencies) erroneously saw its ‘targets’ as lying within neat, unitary and effective national governments, perfectly responsive to the

blueprint of global planners. The State was seen as an impartial instrument for implementing plans. Not much mention was made of the political and class character of the State, or of the political, economic, structural and historical causes of inequality and poverty.

Over the years, some of the critiques have been noted and reflected in the World Bank's changing — and some argue 'softening' — stance on 'development'. It has introduced various 'human'-centred notions of development into its policies, which take into consideration national and local priorities. Whereas in the past the WB and IMF were regarded as operational twins, the WB is now viewed as somewhat de-linked from the market fundamentalism of the IMF. Joseph Stiglitz, for example, former chief economist at the World Bank, observes that the World Bank is responding to locally-specific ground reality.

However, alongside the changes in WB development policy has come the push from the IMF for countries to 'open' their economies, to liberalise: to introduce greater privatisation, relax currency controls, and introduce budgetary austerity (cutbacks on social spending), amongst other measures. The ever-growing World Trade Organisation (WTO) is working alongside the IMF to re-shape global trade policies. This is now often regarded as 'neo-liberalism' or the new 'globalisation' — a forcible integration of the world economy to the advantage of the more economically powerful countries and transnational corporations — that will benefit some, that is, bring about some 'development', but push an even greater number into poverty and entail untold costs in terms of the environment.

Development from above has always been contested, but with growing globalisation, there is a growing multiplicity of opposition: or a 'globalisation from below'. This is evident in the coming together of various anti-globalisation voices on such platforms as the World Social Forum (first held at Porto Allegre in Brazil in 2000 and in Mumbai in January 2004).

This, some argue, indicates an escalating tension between global (or universal) and local (or particular) understandings of how humanity should proceed.

Movements worldwide reflect the resistance. Environmentalism, for example, points out the destruction of unchecked industrialisation and 'development'. Environmentalists point to the dangers of a worldview that sees nature as external to society and progress. They caution against illusory gains in income and permanent losses in wealth.

Some environmental movements focus on protecting bio-regions from environmentally damaging 'development' practices: such as movements against commercial logging in tropical forests in South America, which draw attention to the growing conflict between local cultures and the global market. In Brazil there is a movement to create self-managing extractive reserves (the slain leader Chico Mendes was associated with it) for native tribes and rubber tappers to protect them from encroaching big-business ranchers.

The local and global solutions proposed by environment movements are sometimes grouped under the term 'sustainable development'. The term became popular in official literature after the Brundlandt Report (1987, of the World Commission for Environment and Development) which defined sustainable development as "meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." How this may be achieved, McMichael says, remains a puzzle.

Many of the alternatives proposed to the new globalisation (promoted as a route to 'development') stress decentralisation and community empowerment. They affirm local diversity over abstract homogenising 'expert' knowledge and call for 'decolonisation' by breaking with the global enterprise of 'development'.

One commonly quoted example in this regard is the Chiapas movement in southwestern Mexico. The movement — spearheaded by Subcommandante Marcos — advocates associative politics and the connecting of a broad range of social causes; it stresses community rights, and works on the basis of co-operation, not hierarchy. Chiapas calls for a re-thinking of the nation-state as the basis for top-down development, even as the institutions of the original development project continue to devise measures to ‘improve’ the conditions of the world’s populations.

The destruction of 'development'

50 million people in India have been displaced by 'development' projects

By Jaideep Hardikar

In 2004, Vimalbai, 70, and many others ousted by the Koyna hydroelectric power project in Satara district in Maharashtra, completed 50 years of living uprooted lives. Two generations of families in Satara have now suffered the trauma of displacement forced by a government pursuing 'development' in an apparently independent India. A third generation is gearing up for the unending battle for rehabilitation and other resettlement doles, in a state that claims to have ideal rehabilitation legislation in place.

The Koyna dam, one of the first major mega dam projects after 1947, submerged 105 villages, sweeping out over 100,000 people from their homes in the plains. They were promised free power, an equal share in progress, and proper rehabilitation. People were paid meagre or no compensation. The Maharashtra government is still to resettle the oustees. Fifty years on, the families who were asked by the then leaders to make a sacrifice for the 'progress' and 'development' of the country, are asking, "Why?"

Koyna is only one example of the destruction of the 'development' model pursued so relentlessly in India. L C Jain, former member of the Planning Commission, talks about millions uprooted from their pasts for an elusive future, for some vague 'greater good'. Jain quotes the Mid-Term Appraisal 2000 of the Planning Commission to note, "25 million persons have been displaced since 1950 on account of developmental projects, of which 40% are tribal. Less than 50% have been rehabilitated. The rest have been pauperised by the development process."

These may be conservative figures. Because displacement is usually only understood as direct displacement from land, such figures exclude many groups who are affected but who do not own land. The rehabilitation schemes don't cover landless labourers, fisherfolk and artisans. They ignore thousands outside the designated submergence zone or project areas. Yet all these are also people whose life-support systems are crushed by development projects.

In the past 59 years of planned 'development', the people displaced by development projects — dams, mines, thermal power plants, corridor projects, field firing ranges, express highways, airports, national parks, sanctuaries, industrial townships, even poultry farms — account for over 50 million Indians.

A vast majority are landless and marginal farmers, mostly tribal, dalit or other economically backward communities. One study suggests that roughly one in every ten Indian tribals is a displaced person. Tribals constitute 8% of the country's population, and more than 40% of the displaced persons.

In coastal Guhagar in Ratnagiri, Maharashtra, numerous fisherfolk were forced to move out of their age-old hamlets in the last ten years after losing their fishing rights to a dubious project called Enron. The project was pushed amid talk of murky deals, violating all norms and rules. The Dabhol power plant didn't directly displace large numbers of people. But indirectly, it snatched the livelihoods of many people, despite their persistent protests.

Hundreds of miles away, in central India, the tribals displaced by the Bargi dam — the first big upstream dam built on the Narmada near Jabalpur in the 1990s — are still to come to terms with the impact of the project on their lives. The dam gulped more land than it could ever irrigate. It displaced more people than the planners said it would. Bargi has become a

symbol of planning blunders. The government of Madhya Pradesh has no more money to construct the canals or to produce hydro-electricity.

Over 50,000 people are estimated to have moved out of their hamlets — deemed 'illegal' by the government — in the forests around the huge reservoir. Those who stayed, struggle to survive, day after day. Women eke out a living selling dry wood. Men migrate looking for work. Communities have been shattered, family bonds have crumbled.

"The government could neither irrigate the land nor rehabilitate us," says Munnibai, an oustee of the Bargi dam, who now lives in a rickshawallahs' colony along Jabalpur's Rani Taal, an historic lake that is now a drainage tank. Thousands of such villagers relocated to Jabalpur when their wait for rehabilitation did not yield any result. The farmers of Bargi now pull cycle-rickshaws or work as labourers. Ranibai, who once owned vast stretches of farmlands in the Narmada valley, is a domestic worker in Jabalpur.

Along the serpentine Narmada, displacement is a key word. Ten years from now, probably some of the oldest cultures in India will have been submerged, when all the 30 big dams, 300 medium and 3,000 small dams are built on this single river.

Travel northward to Jharkhand, where millions of people have had to move out of the way for fast-track industrialisation over the last 50 years. Almost nobody knows where and in what condition the displaced adivasis of Jharkhand live today. Tata Nagar has its foundations on a civilisation bulldozed away by the industrial czars of the nation.

Jadugoda, where rich uranium deposits are a much-prized possession of nuclear India, has seen the population of the Santhal tribe systematically brutalised for three decades. Scores of men, women and children face serious health hazards from radiation. About a

dozen villages around the uranium complex are devastated. While India was taking pride in the country's nuclear tests, children were dying of unchecked hazards in the area. A beleaguered Santhal population awaits rehabilitation while paying for a project they did not ask for or support. "If you can't travel to Hiroshima, come here to see what it means to be at the receiving end of a nuclear bomb," says Rameshchandra Mardi, a social activist in Jadugoda.

On the border of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, in the Singrauli region, over 200,000 people have been displaced on different occasions. First by the Rihand dam, then by a series of thermal power plants of the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), followed by mining projects of Central Coalfields Limited (CCL). Singrauli has illuminated the lives of many in the urban centres, but has seen its natives groping in endless darkness, grappling to overcome the trauma of displacement. Thousands of people, who once farmed here on their land, today steal coal from the yards of NTPC or from running trains. Some have been 'rehabilitated', but most don't have any avenue to earn a living.

Displacement by mines or thermal power plants is perhaps less visible than the forced movements of people triggered by dams. The acquisition takes place in phases. The would-be oustees are the last ones to know about their eviction by mines. This gives them little or no chance of resistance or coming together to bargain for a better rehabilitation package.

Often, the government acquires land for, say, a thermal power plant, in the public interest and later hands it over to a private company to build a cement factory. Or it constructs a dam for irrigation but diverts the water of the dam to private industrial zones when the project gets completed. In Maharashtra, a study done by a legislative committee in 2001 found that only about 18% of the water from irrigation projects actually gets used for agriculture.

As things stand today, there's no region in the country where people haven't been displaced by development projects. And there's no region in the country where you would find people rehabilitated according to their aspirations and priorities.

The Nagarhole National Park in Karnataka is another example. About 5,000 tribal families — including aboriginal tribes — were thrown out of the forests they tended for centuries, after the World Bank approved a loan for the conservation project. Many of the tribals living on the fringes of the forests now work for meagre wages as coolies at nearby coffee plantations. Many have sold their children as domestic workers for the urban rich over the past decade.

In Baloda Bazar near Raipur in Chhattisgarh, villagers ceded vast stretches of their immensely fertile paddy farms for mushrooming cement factories, against a promise of good compensation and jobs. No promises were kept. Today, the once-rich farmers pull bicycle rickshaws around Mantralaya in Raipur.

This is India's 21st-century planning and development catastrophe. Where millions pay a price for the benefits of the political and economic elite. Where victims are still, oddly, described as 'beneficiaries'. Where laws that throw people out are cruel, colonial and arbitrary. Where the policies of rehabilitation give little or no respite to those evicted. Where terms like 'national' or 'public interest' at once put these laws and policies beyond question.

And yet, goes the argument, displacement is 'inevitable'. "The nation needs to progress fast-track. So millions must pay a price." But who sacrifices for whom? Why do the have-nots always pay a price for the better-off in India in the name of 'development'?

(Jaideep Hardikar is a journalist based in Nagpur. He was awarded the K K Birla Foundation Media Fellowship in 2001-2002, the N F I National Media Fellowship in 2002-2003, and the Sanskriti Award for Journalism in 2003)

And what about the women?

Development further reinforced and modernised patriarchy

By Sharmila Joshi

In 1948, the UN Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equal rights of men and women. But global development projects initially made women invisible. Most early development models were heavily male-biased: development planners assumed men are the most productive workers. Women's productive role, because it was often not directly linked to the market or the formal economy, was ignored. Instead, their role as reproductive individuals was made ultra-visible.

This became the focus of women-centred development interventions in the early phases of the development project from the 1950s. For example, programmes to control population growth, seen as a primary cause of poverty, began to spring up, with women as targets.

Until the 1970s, women appeared in the global development apparatus almost solely as mothers feeding babies, procuring water for cooking and cleaning, dealing with children's diseases or growing food in their tidy home gardens to supplement the family diet. Only men, considered to be engaged in productive activities, were the targets in programmes intended, for example, to improve agricultural production.

International training programmes supported by such agencies as the FAO and USAID followed these assumptions: agriculture for men, home economics for women. As some feminists observe, development managed to modernise patriarchy. This, when at least 50% of the world's food for direct consumption is produced by women and

women do two-thirds of the world's work.

Often, the socio-economic status of women declined following their exclusion from agricultural development programmes. In many cases, women were relegated to subsistence activities following technical improvements in agriculture. If labour is displaced by new technologies, it is often female labour. For example, if grain mills were introduced to replace mortar and pestle, women were rendered jobless; their skill was marginalised.

In Kenya, for example, women were traditionally rice cultivators. Colonialism brought more men into this work. After World War II, mechanisation for greater yields relegated women to low wage labour in non-mechanised farm activities. More intensive production for the market also displaces more women who then must look for low-paying informal work. All of this involves gradual but great restructuring of family and social relations.

Approaches to development that set in motion such processes have at times made women's living conditions worse, and increased their workload. This "feminisation of poverty", feminist critic Pat Simmons argues, can in fact be seen as a direct result of women's inclusion in the development process. Development, argues anthropologist Arturo Escobar, not only ignored women, but in fact had — and continues to have, in different cases — extremely detrimental effects on women's economic position.

From the 1970s, the notion that women were actors mainly in the reproductive sphere began to be questioned. Over the decades, distinct positions have emerged on gender and development. These frameworks guide development policies, research and practice.

Although all approaches have significantly altered both feminist theory and practice with regard to development, the Women in Development (WID) approach remains the dominant perspective. WID is not homogenous but on the whole WID subscribes to the

assumptions of modernisation theory. However, WID brings women into this picture and stresses their role as agents of social change.

In 1970, Esther Bosrup, an economist, documented women's invisible contribution in the economic sphere. She wrote about the regressive impact of 'development', as commonly understood at the time in official circles, on women's lives and livelihoods. This, Nalini Visvanathan, feminist scholar, writes, "signalled the start of liberal feminist advocacy of the integration of women into development, as workers and as producers".

Some feminists did note at the time that the costs of modernisation/development were being largely borne by women and advocated changes in the approach. However, they did not fundamentally question the premises of modernisation theory. "Modernisation theory depicts traditional societies as authoritarian and male-dominated and modern ones as democratic and egalitarian," Visvanathan writes. The WID school of liberal feminists endorsed this worldview.

WID strategies first came up in USAID's policies in 1973, and began to increase in the UN system. At the World Bank, a division for WID was established in 1987 although WID-influenced activities had begun at the Bank earlier. Many of these early policies were couched in the language of economic efficiency: "investing in human capital" or how "female labour markets" could be "rationalised" to ensure more "equitable participation" by women. Women's productivity began to exist only in relation to its market value and how it could better be exploited.

The WID approach did not call for structural changes in the system in which it sought the inclusion of women. Still, WID's presence at the UN helped push for social legislation which enhanced women's civil and political rights in some countries. WID has helped

mainstream gender issues in many development agencies and increased women's visibility.

Initial critiques of WID consolidated to form the Women and Development (WAD) approach. This approach drew on dependency theory. It argued that WID ignored the structural and socio-economic factors within which gender inequalities are embedded. WAD instead stresses changes in economic production, local class structure, the position of specific regions and sectors in the national and international economy.

For example, Margaret Snyder, a former Unifem director, and Mary Tadesse, feminist scholar, write about women in parts of West Africa who historically had greater economic and social rights until colonisation. In Nigeria, for example, women's courts determined social disputes and women fixed market prices. With colonisation, agricultural patterns changed and so did the role of women. Men migrated to the mines, village economies deteriorated. The status of women changed: technology was introduced to men; title deeds were made out in their names. After the independence movements of the 1950s and '60s, Snyder and Tadesse argue, it's been an uphill battle for women to re-establish their rights. They attempt not to glorify a 'traditional' past but to focus on the interlinking of historical processes and development interventions in the present.

The WAD approach argued that women have always been part of the development process, therefore, 'including' them in development was a contradiction. It looked at how women are integrated in development in a way that sustains existing international structures of inequality. As economists Lourdes Baneria and Gita Sen write. "Contrary to Bosrup's implications, the problem for women is not only the lack of participation in this process as equal partners with men; it is a system that generates and intensifies inequalities, making

use of existing gender hierarchies to place women in subordinate positions at each different level of interaction between class and gender.”

The WAD in turn has been critiqued because it largely neglects the sphere of reproduction and household-level gender relations. In WAD, structural and class analysis dominates at the cost of other equations of domination and subjugation. But WAD extends the WID critique of mainstream development theory.

Another major theoretical approach, Gender and Development (GAD), emerged in the 1980s; it overlaps with WAD but the socialist feminists in this school combine lessons from the limitations of both WID and WAD. According to Kate Young, feminist scholar, GAD focuses not just on women but also on the social relations between men and women, in the workplace and in other settings. “It looks at the totality of social organisation, economic and political life, in order to understand the sharing of particular aspects of society,” she writes.

GAD looks at gender as a relational process. The approach, Young writes, views women as active agents and not passive recipients of ‘development’. GAD treats development as a complex process influenced by political, social and economic forces and questions the role of the market as distributor of benefit. It emphasises the necessary role of the State in promoting women’s emancipation. In seeking progressive structural reforms, GAD shares a common base with WAD and with Marxist and dependency approaches. It opens up new situation-specific strategies for feminist intervention in development processes.

The Women, Environment and Development (WED) approach emerged alongside these other approaches. From the 1970s, eco-feminists had drawn parallels between male control over nature and over women and exposed the assault by masculinity’s scientific and industrial systems on the ecological health of the planet. In 1972, at the NGO conference

held parallel to the UN Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm, local initiatives to protect forests, such as the Chipko movement in India, were reported. At the Nairobi Forum in 1985, held parallel to the UN Women and Development Conference, women's role in environmental management was presented in case studies of women's involvement in forestry, agriculture, and energy. By the late-1980s, national and international events that focused on the WED theme gained momentum.

Feminist models of sustainable development have emerged over the years as alternatives to those put forward by development economists. Advocates such as Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva recommend fundamental changes in the dominant discourse of development to incorporate women's voices and local-knowledge systems, gender relations, cultural specificity and political ecology.

Although all approaches tend to intersect and overlap at some point, they differ in their analyses and strategies. Groups working on gender issues in India — politically-affiliated as well as those apparently independent of political leanings — usually draw on (and often extend) one or more of these conceptualisations of development and of gender.

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